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Introduction 
It would be an honor for me to speak to you at any time, but I’m 
particularly honored to be doing so now, on the thirtieth anniversary 
of the Sumner Canary Lecture delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, my 
former boss and mentor. His lecture, titled Assorted Canards of 
Contemporary Legal Analysis, described his “most hated legal 
canards”—baseless but frequently repeated statements that lawyers are 
“condemned to read, again and again, in the reported cases.”1 He took 
aim, for example, at the hoary canon that “remedial statutes are to be 
broadly construed.” He asked, “How are we to know what is a remedial 
statute?” “Are not all statutes intended to remedy some social 
problem?” “And why should we construe any statute broadly?” 
Statutes should be construed neither broadly nor narrowly, but at the 
level of generality at which they are written. And he bemoaned the 
well-worn phrase, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little 
minds.” Why is consistency in the law a bad thing? 
Tonight, in the spirit of Justice Scalia’s Canary Lecture, I’m going 
to share my own list of canards.  
 
†  Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This Essay 
is adapted from the 2019 Sumner Canary Lecture delivered at Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law on September 19, 2019. 
1. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 581, 581 (1989). 
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I. Textualism is Literalism 
Here is my first: “textualism is literalism.” Before I explain why 
this is false, I ought to begin with a very brief definition of textualism. 
Textualism, a method of statutory interpretation closely associated 
with Justice Scalia, insists that judges must construe statutory 
language consistent with its “ordinary meaning.”2 The law is comprised 
of words—and textualists emphasize that words mean what they say, 
not what a judge thinks that they ought to say. For textualists, 
statutory language is a hard constraint. Fidelity to the law means 
fidelity to the text as it is written. 
Textualism stands in contrast to purposivism, a method of 
statutory interpretation that was dominant through much of the 
twentieth century. For purposivists, statutory language isn’t necessarily 
a hard constraint. As one famous Supreme Court case put it, “[A] thing 
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”3 
Sometimes, statutory language appears to be in tension with a statute’s 
overarching goal, and when that happens, purposivists argue that a 
judge should go with the goal rather than the text. 
Today, purposivism is largely out of fashion, at least in its more 
extreme form. It was once unsurprising to see a judicial opinion stress 
the importance of adhering to a statute’s purpose even at the expense 
of clear text. Now, however, it’s rare to see a judicial opinion asserting 
the authority to depart from the statutory text in service of the 
statutory purpose. The shift away from purposivism is largely due to 
the force of Justice Scalia’s arguments. As he put it, “It is the law that 
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they 
will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.”4 I won’t 
rehearse all of his arguments against purposivism here, but suffice it to 
say that they have had a significant effect on the way that lawyers and 
judges think about the law. 
The fact that textualism has become influential, however, does not 
mean that everyone understands what it means to be a textualist. And 
one misunderstanding—held by some of textualism’s sympathizers as 
well as by some of its critics—is that textualism is literalism. Some who 
have only passing familiarity with the theory assume that textualism 
requires judges to construe language in a wooden, literalistic way. And 
that, of course, would lead to absurd results. 
If you want a vivid illustration of the dangers of literalism, consider 
the pitfalls of translating from one language to another. When I was in 
 
2. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 69–77 (2012). 
3. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
4. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and 
the Law 17 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1997). 
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college, I spent a summer in France with the primary goal of becoming 
fluent in French. One evening at dinner, my host asked if I wanted 
more food, and I responded, translating literally, “Je suis pleine”—“I 
am full.” I was proud of myself for responding in French. But my 
sentence was greeted with uproarious laughter—and not, as I initially 
assumed, because I spoke French with a distinctive southeastern 
Louisiana accent. It was much worse than that. I learned that in 
French, the phrase “je suis pleine” means “I am pregnant.” One could 
make a similar gaffe by declining food with the phrase “je suis fini,” 
which, literally translated, means “I am finished.” In French, though, 
this phrase means “I am about to expire.” Perhaps such mistakes might 
make one want to expire. 
As a budding French speaker, I was unaware of the nuance. 
Language is a social construct made possible by shared linguistic 
conventions among those who speak the language. It cannot be 
understood out of context, and literalism strips language of its context. 
As my examples illustrate, fluent speakers of language are not 
literalists. There is a lot more to understanding language than mech-
anistically consulting dictionary definitions. 
Textualists understand this, and they have spent more than thirty 
years driving home the point. Justice Scalia himself insisted that “the 
good textualist is not a literalist.”5 Still, textualism and literalism are 
often treated as synonyms. The distinction between them, though, is 
fundamental to the validity of the textualist enterprise. Here is how one 
scholar distinguishes the two: 
Literalism should be distinguished from the genuine search for 
textual meaning based on the way people commonly understand 
language. Literalism is a kind of “spurious” textualism, 
unconcerned with how people actually communicate—with how 
the author wanted to use language or the audience might 
understand it. It holds up the text in isolation from actual usage.6 
Collapsing the distinction is a strawman when presented by critics of 
textualism and a dangerous distortion when floated by textualists 
themselves. It bears emphasis, though, that this might be the most 
common misperception of textualism. I teach a seminar on statutory 
interpretation, and after our class on textualism, students routinely say 
that they were surprised to learn that textualism isn’t the same thing 
as either “literalism” or “strict construction.” Despite the best efforts 
of textualists, the caricature is still around. 
 
5. Id. at 24. 
6. William D. Popkin, Material on Legislation: Political Language 
and the Political Process 224 (3d ed. 2001). 
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II. A Dictionary is the Textualist’s Most Important 
Tool 
This rejection of literalism bleeds right into the next proposition 
that I would like to shoot down: “A dictionary is a textualist’s most 
important tool.” Don’t get me wrong—a dictionary is a tool, and it is 
one used by interpreters of all stripes. But because textualism isn’t 
literalism, textualists do not come to the enterprise of statutory 
interpretation armed only with a dictionary. As John Manning—a 
prominent textualist scholar (and now dean of Harvard Law School)—
explains, “[D]ictionary definitions of words will often fail to account for 
settled nuances or background conventions that qualify the literal 
meaning of language and, in particular, of legal language.”7 A dictionary 
can help, but it can’t get you all the way there. 
Justice Scalia frequently invoked the case Smith v. United States to 
make this point.8 In that case, the Supreme Court was faced with the 
task of deciding what it means to “use a firearm” for purposes of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), a statute that prohibits a felon from using a gun.9 
The majority (of which Justice Scalia was not a member) cited multiple 
dictionary definitions of the verb “to use” and concluded that “[a]s the 
dictionary definitions and experience make clear, one can use a firearm 
in a number of ways.”10 So it held that a person who trades his firearm 
for drugs “uses” the firearm during a drug-trafficking crime within the 
meaning of § 924(c)(1).11 
In dissent, Justice Scalia explained that the fact that a word can 
be used a certain way does not mean that it is ordinarily used that way 
or that it was used that way in a particular context.12 In his view, the 
majority’s reliance on multiple, broad dictionary definitions of what the 
term “use” could mean violated the “fundamental principle of statutory 
construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a 
word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the 
context in which it is used.”13 In typical fashion, he offered a memorable 
illustration to bring his point home: 
When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring 
whether you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick 
on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with 
 
7. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2393 
(2003). 
8. 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 228–30. 
11. Id. at 225. 
12. Id. at 241–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
13. Id. at 241 (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)). 
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a cane. Similarly, to speak of “using a firearm” is to speak of using 
it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.14  
This isn’t to say that dictionaries are useless; it’s simply a warning 
against overstating their usefulness. They should be used as evidence 
that terms can in fact bear a certain meaning, not as conclusive 
evidence of what a term means in context. 
The upshot here is that textualism isn’t about holding language “in 
isolation from actual usage.” It isn’t about taking things out of context 
or strictly construing language that isn’t strict. It is about identifying 
the plain communicative content of the words. “A text should not be 
construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should 
be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”15 
III. Textualists and Originalists Always Agree  
I hope I’ve made it clear by now that textualism isn’t a mechanical 
exercise, but rather one involving a sophisticated understanding of 
language as it’s actually used in context. That principle brings me to 
my third canard: “Textualists always agree.” Those who take an 
oversimplified view of textualism imagine that it works like Google 
Translate: a judge punches in words, and—voila!—out pops the result. 
If that were how interpretation worked, one could expect every 
textualist judge to interpret text in exactly the same way. Popping 
words into a mental machine, after all, does not require judgment. 
Construing language in context, however, does require judgment. 
Skilled users of language won’t always agree on what language means 
in context. Textualist judges agree that the words of a statute 
constrain—but they may not always agree on what the words mean. 
Thus, in a case that preceded my time on the Seventh Circuit, two of 
my colleagues on the court—both textualists—disagreed about whether 
Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.16 Judge Frank 
Easterbrook joined the majority, which held that it does;17 Judge Diane 
Sykes wrote a dissent arguing that it does not.18 Neither disavowed the 
text; they simply disagreed about what the text meant. 
The same holds true for originalists, who insist that judges must 
adhere to the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text. 
Justices Scalia and Thomas are both known as originalists, yet they 
 
14. Id. at 242. 
15. Scalia, supra note 4, at 23. 
16. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc). 
17. Id. at 340–41.  
18. Id. at 359 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
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didn’t agree in every case. The differences between them enable my 
friend Judge Amul Thapar of the Sixth Circuit to teach a class at the 
University of Virginia that he colloquially describes as “Scalia versus 
Thomas.” Here is an example of a case in which those two Justices 
diverged: in Davis v. Washington,19 the Court had to decide whether 
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission 
of statements made during a 911 call.20 Justice Scalia wrote the majority 
opinion, grounding the Court’s decision in an analogy to statements 
that would have been considered “testimonial” at common law.21 The 
relevant portion of the 911 call qualified as “nontestimonial hearsay,” 
the majority held, because its “primary purpose” was not “to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution” 
but rather “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”22 
Justice Thomas, by contrast, rejected the majority’s “primary purpose” 
test.23 He chided the majority for selecting a standard “disconnected 
from history” and observed that “the Court all but concedes that no 
case can be cited for its conclusion.”24 Justice Thomas read the 
historical record to support a much narrower Confrontation Clause test: 
only those statements that “include ‘extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’” are prohibited from 
admission.25 
On the current Court, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have been the 
most vocal about their commitment to originalism. But they don’t 
always agree either. Just last Term, they split in Gamble v. United 
States, a case that validated the so-called “dual sovereignty doctrine” 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.26 That doctrine means that two offenses 
are not “the same offense” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
if they are prosecuted by separate sovereigns.27 Thus, the federal 
government can’t prosecute someone twice for the same murder, but 
the Double Jeopardy Clause doesn’t bar the state and federal 
governments from each prosecuting someone for the same murder. 
 
19. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
20. Id. at 817. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 822. 
23. Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
24. Id. at 838. 
25. Id. at 836 (alteration in original) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
26. 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019). 
27. Id. at 1977. 
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Where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws and therefore two 
different offenses. 
Justice Gorsuch dissented from that holding on the ground that the 
dual-sovereignty doctrine is inconsistent with the original meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment.28 Justice Thomas, however, agreed with the 
majority. In his concurring opinion, he had this to say: 
The historical record presents knotty issues about the original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and Justice Gorsuch does an 
admirable job arguing against our longstanding interpretation of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although Justice Gorsuch identifies 
support for his view in several postratification treatises, I do not 
find these treatises conclusive without a stronger showing that 
they reflected the understanding of the Fifth Amendment at the 
time of ratification. . . . Ultimately, I am not persuaded that our 
precedent is incorrect as an original matter, much less 
demonstrably erroneous.29  
In short, even card-carrying originalists don’t always wind up at 
the same spot, and it oversimplifies originalism to expect that they 
always will. 
IV. “[W]e must never forget, it is a constitution we 
are expounding.” 
In his Canary Lecture thirty years ago, Justice Scalia identified and 
attempted to correct the common misuse of one of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s most famous quotes from McCulloch v. Maryland: “[W]e 
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”30 Justice 
Scalia explained that this quote “is often trotted out, nowadays, to 
make the point that the Constitution does not have a fixed meaning—
that it must be given different content, from generation to generation, 
retaining the ‘flexibility’ needed to keep up with the times.”31 In his 
view, this reading of Chief Justice Marshall’s language is exactly 
backwards. Rather than sanctioning judicially guided constitutional 
evolution, the McCulloch quote is simply an acknowledgment that “it 
is the nature of a constitution not to set forth everything in express and 
 
28. Id. at 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]his ‘separate sovereigns 
exception’ to the bar against double jeopardy finds no meaningful support 
in the text of the Constitution, its original public meaning, structure, or 
history.”). 
29. Id. at 1987 (citation omitted). 
30. Scalia, supra note 1, at 594 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). 
31. Id. 
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minute detail” precisely because it is a fixed document “intended to 
endure for ages to come” as is.32 
So Justice Scalia made the point that the McCulloch quote offers 
no support for a theory of an evolving constitution. Today, I want to 
make a different but related point: the McCulloch quote offers no 
support for the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted 
differently from other legal texts. After all, the Constitution is, at its 
base, democratically enacted written law. Our approach to interpreting 
it should be the same as it is with all written law. 
I willingly concede that no matter how one reads “[W]e must never 
forget, it is a constitution we are expounding,” Chief Justice Marshall 
surely meant to communicate that the Constitution is unique.33 And he 
was indisputably right. None of our other written laws purport to lay 
out an entire system of government meant to endure through the ages. 
That singularity often manifests itself in expansive phrasing and broad 
delegations of congressional and executive authority to address 
unforeseen circumstances.34 But as Justice Scalia explained elsewhere, 
“The problem [of interpreting the Constitution] is distinctive, not 
because special principles of interpretation apply, but because the usual 
principles are being applied to an unusual text.”35 The text itself 
remains a legal document, subject to the ordinary tools of 
interpretation. 
Due in large part, I’m sure, to Justice Scalia’s contributions, the 
idea of approaching the Constitution like any other legal text has gained 
not only traction but force in judicial opinions, and it has inspired a 
rich proliferation of scholarship in the area.36 For example, Vasan 
 
32. Id. at 595–96 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415). 
33. Id. at 594.  
34. See Scalia, supra note 4, at 37 (“In textual interpretation, context is 
everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-
picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than 
narrow interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language 
will not bear.”); see also John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and 
the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1699–
700 (2004) (“Marshall’s statement merely addressed the virtue of recognizing 
adequate congressional authority to address unforeseen circumstances under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.”); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: 
A Critical Introduction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 387 (2013) (“As 
originalists have long recognized (and sometimes even emphasized), the 
power-granting provisions of the Constitution are designed to give the 
legislative and executive branches discretionary authority to make policy 
and the necessary tools to implement those policies.”). 
35. Scalia, supra note 4, at 37; see also id. at 38 (“What I look for in the 
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning 
of the text . . . .”). 
36. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 34, at 1670 (“Whereas the Rehnquist Court 
has tended toward textualism in statutory cases, few would contend that 
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Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen have emphasized that “any 
project of constitutional interpretation that seeks to apply the 
Constitution as law must reckon with the fact that it is a written text 
that the Constitution purports to make authoritative.”37 They also 
point out that judges take an oath to be bound by that written text.38 
So what does it mean to be bound by written law? Well, at the 
very least it means that the meaning of the law is fixed when it is 
written. This is a largely, though not entirely, uncontroversial propo–
sition when it comes to statutory interpretation. Textualists and 
purposivists are both inclined to ground their approaches to statutory 
interpretation in the concept of faithful agency, giving voice and 
authority to what the enacting Congress did in a particular statute.39 
Textualists, though, place more significance on the very existence 
of a written, enacted law. As I said before, textualists limit the meaning 
of text to the semantic communicative content (in context) of the words 
themselves—not some underlying purpose behind the words—because 
it is the words themselves that are written down and enacted. Indeed, 
those words “reflect (unknowable) legislative compromise,” and “the 
carefully drawn lawmaking process prescribed by the Constitution 
makes it imperative for judges to respect such compromise.”40 That 
means reading the text of the statute at the level of specificity and 
generality at which it was written, even if the result is awkward or the 
interpretation “does not appear to make perfect sense of the statute’s 
 
constitutional interpretation warrants the same strictness as statutory 
interpretation. Instead, the conventional wisdom, often traced (mistakenly) 
to McCulloch v. Maryland, presupposes that judges have greater freedom 
to interpret the Constitution atextually to effectuate its broader purposes. 
. . . I argue here that the conventional wisdom is backwards . . . .”). 
37. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1128 (2003). 
38. Id. at 1127–28 (“But if one does decide to be bound by [the Constitution] 
(and takes an oath to support it, as the very next clause of the 
Constitution requires for all legislative, executive, and judicial officers 
holding positions under the regime created by the Constitution), one 
necessarily has decided to be bound by the text as law, because that is 
what the document itself appears to specify.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 
19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 8–9 (2016) (describing originalism’s claim that 
the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text is enforceable law). 
39. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2001) (“[I]t is important to realize that strong 
purposivism and textualism differ markedly in technique, but they do so 
in the name of an ostensibly shared constitutional premise. In particular, 
strong purposivism and textualism both seek to provide a superior way 
for federal judges to fulfill their presumed duty as Congress’s faithful 
agents.”). 
40. Manning, supra note 34, at 1713. 
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overall policy.”41 That awkward compromise made it through the 
process of becoming law. 
When we look at the Constitution for what it is—a popularly 
enacted legal text subject to the same kind of “bargaining and 
compromise over the reach and structure of the policy under 
consideration”42—it makes sense that statutory textualists are usually 
constitutional originalists.43 These approaches are premised on the same 
fundamental orientation toward legal text that finds legitimacy in 
popular sovereignty. Kesavan and Paulsen summarize the import of 
written law this way: 
We therefore think that to avoid creeping or lurching 
anachronism infecting the interpretation of an authoritative legal 
text, the proper approach must be one of “originalist” 
textualism—faithful application of the words and phrases of the 
text in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the 
time they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic 
community that adopted the text as law.44  
Originalists, like textualists, care about what people understood words 
to mean at the time that the law was enacted because those people had 
the authority to make law. They did so through legitimate processes, 
which included writing down and fixing the law. So “[e]ach textual 
provision must necessarily bear the meaning attributed to it at the time 
of its own adoption.”45 And, as with statutes, the law can mean no more 
or less than that communicated by the language in which it is written. 
Just as “when a precise statute seems over- or underinclusive in relation 
to its ultimate aims[,] . . . [a textualist] hews closely to the rules 
embedded in the enacted text, rather than adjusting that text to make 
it more consistent with its apparent purposes,” so too an originalist 
submits to the precise compromise reflected in the text of the 
 
41. Manning, supra note 39, at 3–4; see also Manning, supra note 34, at 1665, 
1735. 
42. Manning, supra note 34, at 1715. 
43. See Manning, supra note 39, at 26. 
44. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 37, at 1131. 
45. Whittington, supra note 34, at 377–78; see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & 
Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 Geo. L.J. 97, 129 (“Putting 
the Constitution in writing was one of the ways in which the law of the 
Constitution was to be fixed.”); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia 
v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923, 944–46 (2009) 
(explaining the originalist premise that the meaning of the Constitution’s 
text is fixed at the time of its formal legal approval). 
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Constitution.46 That is how judges approach legal text, and the 
Constitution is no exception. 
I will end this section where I started, leaving you with a simple 
but astute observation from Justice Scalia himself. The judiciary is 
charged with authoritatively interpreting the Constitution because it is 
a legal text—and interpreting it requires the same tools and skills that 
one would bring to bear on any other legal text. Were it otherwise—
that is, “if the people come to believe that the Constitution is not a 
text like other texts; that it means, not what it says or what it was 
understood to mean, but what it should mean”—"well, then, they will 
look for qualifications other than impartiality, judgment, and lawyerly 
acumen in those whom they select to interpret it.”47 This is a 
Constitution that we are expounding, unique in many ways. But it is 
also, at its core, a legal text, and we should not misconstrue a quote 
from the great Chief Justice Marshall as license to treat it as anything 
else. 
V. Judicial Activism is a Meaningful Term 
As for the next canard, I will be brief—but I think my point will 
be clear. The term “judicial activist” is thrown around a lot today, both 
inside and outside the legal world. People use it all the time with great 
authority, confident that they know exactly who the judicial activists 
are. But there is no agreed-upon definition of what it means to be an 
activist. The only thing that is clear is that it is never a compliment. 
Sometimes, people use the term “judicial activism” to describe a 
judge who is willing to hold a statute or executive action unconsti–
tutional. Judicial restraint, the argument goes, means deference to the 
popular will; it is activism, therefore, to say that the popular will has 
run afoul of constitutional limits. The problem, however, is that it has 
been settled since Marbury v. Madison that judicial review is part of 
the judicial function.48 Everyone agrees that judges—within the limits 
of their authority, of course—must hold political actors accountable to 
 
46. Manning, supra note 34, at 1665; see id. at 1702 (“Precisely because 
political minorities do have an extraordinary right to insist upon 
compromise in the framing of constitutional texts, it is especially 
important to pay attention to the level of generality of the relevant text—
that is, the type of compromise reached.”); Whittington, supra note 34, 
at 386 (“Originalism has instead recently emphasized the value of fidelity 
to the constitutional text as its driving principle. The goal of 
constitutional interpretation is not to restrict the text to the most 
manageable, easily applied, or majority-favoring rules. The goal is to 
faithfully reproduce what the constitutional text requires. Textual rules 
need not be narrow. The breadth of the rule is determined by the 
embodied principle, not an a priori commitment to narrowness.”). 
47. Scalia, supra note 4, at 46–47. 
48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
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the Constitution. If a statute or executive action is unconstitutional, a 
judge discharges her judicial duty by calling a spade a spade. So if 
judicial activism merely means exercising judicial review, then it simply 
describes a well-settled and uncontroversial part of what judges do. 
When people use the term “judicial activism,” I think they are 
really referring to a misuse of judicial authority. Criticizing misuses of 
judicial authority is fair game, but we ought to do it with an 
explanation of why a particular decision was misguided. As David 
Kaplan wrote in his recent book about the Supreme Court, judicial 
activism today means nothing more than “what the other guy does.”49 
It goes without saying that finger-pointing isn’t an argument. 
VI. Congressional Silence is Acquiescence 
My next canard returns to statutory interpretation. It is the notion 
that congressional inaction can tell us something about what Congress 
thinks—what is known as “congressional acquiescence.” One noted 
scholar and judge has explained the logic of the acquiescence rationale 
this way: “When a court says to a legislature, ‘You (or your 
predecessor) meant X,’ it almost invites the legislature to answer: ‘We 
did not.’”50 So, the theory goes, if the legislature does not respond, then 
the court, as Congress’s faithful agent, should treat its silence as 
acquiescence or approval and stay the course even if the original 
interpretation was wrong.  
But there are several reasons why such an approach makes little 
sense. For starters, why should we care what the current Congress 
thinks about a previously enacted statute? Whether you think that 
what matters is “the language of the statute enacted by Congress,”51 
the intent or purpose behind the enacted statute,52 or something else, 
 
49. David A. Kaplan, The Most Dangerous Branch 12 (2018). 
50. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 31–32 
(1982); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts 
of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 322 (2005); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 71–78 (1988); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 
1361, 1402–08 (1988). 
51. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002); see also Johnson 
v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It 
is . . . [a] patently false premise that the correctness of statutory 
construction is to be measured by what the current Congress desires, 
rather than by what the law as enacted meant.”). 
52. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 
(1980); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); European Cmty. 
v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
“expressions of legislative intent made years after the statute’s initial 
enactment are entitled to limited weight under any circumstances, even 
when the post-enactment views of Congress as a whole are evident”), 
vacated by 544 U.S. 1012 (2005). 
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most theories of statutory interpretation seek to give a statute the 
meaning it had at the time that it was enacted.53 So what a later 
Congress thinks is irrelevant.54 
And even if we did care, there is no way to reliably count on 
congressional silence as a source of information. There are many reasons 
other than approval for why Congress might not pass a bill to override 
a court’s interpretation of a statute.55 For one, Congress must first know 
about the judicial decision before the body can make a collective, 
conscious decision to act (or not act) in response—and that is not a 
given.56 Then, even assuming that Congress knows about a given 
judicial interpretation and disagrees with the decision, it may be 
deterred from acting out of concern for political expedience: Who takes 
the credit? Who bears the responsibility? Is this the best time to act to 
achieve the best result? How much capital—both political and 
monetary—will this legislation cost? And on and on.57 But let us assume 
that Congress knows about the decision, disagrees with it, and would 
like to respond. Political realities might still prevent it from doing so. 
This won’t come as news to anyone, but passing legislation is hard and 
resources are limited. As I’ve said elsewhere, “Numerous obstacles, both 
 
53. See Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an 
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 193 
(1989). 
54. See id. at 193 (“No one has ever explained how a court attempting to 
understand the intent of a Congress that passed a statute in 1866 or 1870 
can find any guidance in the views of a Congress sitting in the 1970s.”); 
Price, 361 U.S. at 313 (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”). 
55. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (“Congressional 
inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable 
inferences may be drawn from such inaction.”) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 
U.S. 164, 187 (1994)); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 
175 n.1 (1989) (“It does not follow . . . that Congress’ failure to overturn 
a statutory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is 
‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional 
failure to act represents’ affirmative congressional approval of the Court’s 
statutory interpretation.”) (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
56. See Marshall, supra note 53, at 187 (“[I]t seems quite unrealistic to assume 
that a substantial number of congressional actors are routinely made 
aware of most court decisions on statutory matters. This being the case, 
how can a court possibly find acquiescence in Congress’ silence?”). And if 
members of Congress are unaware of Supreme Court decisions on matters 
of statutory interpretation, it would seem even less likely that Congress 
is aware of decisions at the court of appeals level. See Stefanie A. 
Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit 
Court Decisions, 85 Judicature 61, 61 (2001). 
57. See Barrett, supra note 50, at 335–36; Marshall, supra note 53, at 190–
91. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020 
Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis 
868 
procedural and practical, hinder the passage of legislation, and, as a 
result, even a legislature with a majority that vehemently disagrees with 
a judicial decision may fail to act on its disagreement.”58 Thus, 
mistaking inaction for agreement “reflects a simple and complete 
misunderstanding of the legislative process.”59 
Equating abstract agreement with any kind of legal salience also 
reflects a misunderstanding of the separation of powers prescribed by 
the Constitution. This is the most fundamental flaw in the 
approval-by-silence approach. Even if we could know that Congress’s 
current silence on a particular statutory question meant that it whole–
heartedly endorsed a court’s interpretation of that statute, that 
approval is not the standard by which the Constitution confers legal 
effect. To have the force of law, a bill must be passed by both Houses 
of Congress and presented to the President for possible veto.60 Congress 
can’t shirk the responsibility of acting, sidestep procedural obstacles, or 
skirt the President’s veto power in the name of efficiency. And courts 
can’t usurp any of those same powers by assuming away the 
bicameralism and presentment requirements. The Supreme Court has 
been clear on this point: those requirements serve “essential constitu–
tional functions . . . [and] represent[] the Framers’ decision that the 
legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with 
a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”61 
Relying on congressional silence for legal meaning thwarts that finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. 
I will conclude this section with a warning from Justice Frankfurter, 
who was one of the first to recognize this canard and call out its folly: 
To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress 
itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities. . . . 
Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy 
might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury 
and of Congress, but they would only be sufficient to indicate 
that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of 
corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.62  
It is, of course, a good thing that we have a process by which 
Congress can override a court’s interpretation of a statute if the 
 
58. Barrett, supra note 50, at 336. 
59. Id. 
60. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (bicameralism and presentment). 
61. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); 
see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) 
(“Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the passage of a bill 
which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President. Congressional 
inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.”) (citation omitted). 
62. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119–21 (1940). 
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interpretation does not reflect what Congress meant. But congressional 
silence in the face of a judicial decision—constitutionally and prac–
tically—has no legitimate role in that process. 
Conclusion 
Justice Scalia ended his Canary Lecture not because he was out of 
canards, but because he was out of time.63 Likewise, I could list canards 
until the cows come home, but I will follow my boss’s lead and conclude 
my remarks here. I hope that my contribution to Justice Scalia’s list 
has shown that the last three decades have not done much to eradicate 
our canard problem. We lawyers love to repeat what has already been 
written—it’s our stock-in-trade. In its best form, our invocation of 
vintage verbiage serves the purpose of tying us to precedent and 
creating continuity in the law. But in its worst form we reflexively 
repeat these “certain ritual errors” without scrutiny.64 We should not 
mistake ubiquity for accuracy. 
 
 
63. Scalia, supra note 1, at 596. 
64. Id. at 581. 
